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I. INTRODUCTION
Even for the most cavalier of baseball fans, it is hard to follow
America’s pastime without eventually hearing someone shout, “Tie
goes to the runner!”  From parental critiques of Little League officials
to managerial ejections in the Majors, no shortage of breath has been
spent arguing calls based on one of baseball’s most iconic rules.  Ironi-
cally, however, the “rule” is not a rule at all.1  Official Baseball Rule
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
* David M. Pontier, J.D. candidate, 2017, University of Nebraska College of Law.  I
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course, my family.  All errors are mine.
1. See Mark Dewdney, “Come on, Blue: Tie Goes to the Runner!” No, It Does Not.,
BLEACHER REP. (July 27, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/225160-come-
on-blue-tie-goes-to-the-runner-no-it-does-not [https://perma.unl.edu/WRD6-
DEVK].
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7.01 unequivocally states that a baserunner is safe if he touches a
base “before he is out.”2  A tie, therefore, results in an out.  Yet, this
rule has been consistently misapplied to the point where the incorrect
rule has swallowed the correct one.3  In a similar fashion, the misap-
plication of the primary-caregiver preference threatens to swallow the
rule of law in Nebraska—with Rommers4 leading the way.
Physical custody determinations over minor children are often
long, exhaustive, and expensive battles between two feuding parents.5
For a variety of reasons, Nebraska courts are often tasked with
awarding sole physical custody of minor children to one of two other-
wise fit parents.6  This responsibility forces trial courts to determine
which parent, if awarded sole physical custody, would serve the child’s
best interests.  When coupled with the prospect of one parent remov-
ing the child to another state, Nebraska courts have stated that custo-
dial determinations are among “the most difficult issues that trial
courts face . . . .”7  Because of the great difficulty in resolving these
determinations, some Nebraska courts have resorted to the primary-
caregiver preference to break the tie.8
Within the last decade, the Supreme Court of Nebraska has used
the primary-caregiver preference in whole or in part to uphold custody
awards in four decisions.9  Yet, despite the supreme court’s recent
treatment of the primary-caregiver preference and the intentions of
the Nebraska Legislature, the Court of Appeals of Nebraska misap-
plied the timing and function of the primary-caregiver preference in
Rommers.
Part II of this Note explores Nebraska statutes and recent case law
relevant to the primary-caregiver preference within the scope of child-
custody awards.  Part II also provides an exposition of the facts and
holdings of Rommers.  Finally, Part III of this Note examines the legal
2. OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL, OFFICIAL RULES OF BASEBALL 7.01
(2014), http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/y2014/official_baseball_rules.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/X6CW-T5XV] (emphasis added).
3. See Dewdney, supra note 1.
4. Rommers v. Rommers, 22 Neb. App. 606, 619, 858 N.W.2d 607, 617 (2014).
5. See Leah Hoffman, To Have and to Hold on to, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2006, 5:00 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2006/11/07/divorce-costs-legal-biz-cx_lh_1107legaldivorce
.html (finding the average cost of a divorce in 2006 ranged between $15,000 and
$30,000 in the United States).
6. See, e.g., Gress v. Gress, 271 Neb. 122, 125, 710 N.W.2d 318, 324 (2006) (“[T]he
trial court expressly found that both [parents were] fit parents to have custody of
the children.”).
7. Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 257 Neb. 242, 255, 597 N.W.2d 592, 601 (1999).
8. See, e.g., Gress, 271 Neb. at 126, 710 N.W.2d at 325 (finding no abuse of discre-
tion in the trial court’s award of sole physical custody to a parent based on that
parent’s prior role as the child’s primary caregiver).
9. See Molczyk v. Molczyk, 285 Neb. 96, 109, 825 N.W.2d 435, 446 (2013); Kamal v.
Imroz, 277 Neb. 116, 122, 759 N.W.2d 914, 918 (2009); Maska v. Maska, 274 Neb.
629, 635, 742 N.W.2d 492, 497 (2007); Gress, 271 Neb. at 126, 710 N.W.2d at 325.
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framework of the primary-caregiver analysis applied by the Rommers
court, while discussing the potential effects of this analytical frame-
work on future custody awards.  Ultimately, this Note is a cautionary
tale against a mutated application of an old custody presumption—an
application with potentially powerful ramifications for Nebraska
families.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Nebraska Child Custody Statutory Provisions
Nebraska trial courts determine child custody using the language
of the Nebraska Parenting Act10 and various other statutes and com-
mon law doctrines.11  Section 42-364 of the Parenting Act provides in
part:
(2) In determining legal custody or physical custody, the court shall not give
preference to either parent based on the sex of the parent and, except as pro-
vided in section 43-2933, no presumption shall exist that either parent is more
fit or suitable than the other.  Custody shall be determined on the basis of the
best interests of the child, as defined in the Parenting Act.  Unless parental
rights are terminated, both parents shall continue to have the rights stated in
section 42-381.
(3) Custody of a minor child may be placed with both parents on a joint legal
custody or joint physical custody basis, or both, (a) when both parents agree to
such an arrangement in the parenting plan and the court determines that
such an arrangement is in the best interests of the child or (b) if the court
specifically finds, after a hearing in open court, that joint physical custody or
joint legal custody, or both, is in the best interests of the minor child regard-
less of any parental agreement or consent.12
Nebraska courts have interpreted the Parenting Act to require a
two-pronged approach for determining child custody.13  The first
prong requires Nebraska courts to inquire whether either parent seek-
ing custody is fit.14  With regard to this prong, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska has defined parental fitness in the negative, stating that
parental unfitness is “a personal deficiency or incapacity which has
prevented, or will probably prevent, performance of a reasonable pa-
rental obligation in child rearing and which has caused, or probably
10. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-2920–43-2943 (Reissue 2016).  Section 43-2920.01 was re-
pealed and replaced in 2016, but should be considered part of this range. See
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2920.01 (Cum. Supp. 2014 & Supp. 2015) (repealed 2016).
11. See, e.g., Robb v. Robb, 268 Neb. 694, 701–02, 687 N.W.2d 195, 202 (2004) (dis-
cussing Nebraska Parenting Act requirements and various other common law
doctrines required for consideration by trial courts when determining custody
awards).
12. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(2)–(3) (Reissue 2016).
13. Maska, 274 Neb. at 633, 742 N.W.2d at 496; Gress, 271 Neb. at 125, 710 N.W.2d
at 324; Robb, 268 Neb. at 701–02, 687 N.W.2d at 202; Rommers v. Rommers, 22
Neb. App. 606, 617, 858 N.W.2d 607, 616 (2014).
14. Maska, 274 Neb. at 633, 742 N.W.2d at 496.
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will result in, detriment to a child’s well-being.”15  If, after resolving
this inquiry, Nebraska courts are unable to award custody by distin-
guishing between two parties on the grounds of parental fitness, then
the second prong of the approach requires Nebraska courts to perform
a best-interests analysis to determine custody.16  The Parenting Act
requires Nebraska courts to consider the following factors in their
best-interests analyses:
(a) The relationship of the minor child to each parent prior to the commence-
ment of the action or any subsequent hearing;
(b) The desires and wishes of the minor child, if of an age of comprehension
but regardless of chronological age, when such desires and wishes are based
on sound reasoning;
(c) The general health, welfare, and social behavior of the minor child;
(d) Credible evidence of abuse inflicted on any family or household member.
For purposes of this subdivision, abuse and family or household member shall
have the meanings prescribed in section 42–903; and
(e) Credible evidence of child abuse or neglect or domestic intimate partner
abuse.  For purposes of this subdivision, the definitions in section 43–2922
shall be used.17
This multifactor approach covers a variety of issues surrounding
minor children in custody disputes.  Nebraska courts must consider
the child’s relationship to each parent before the commencement of
the action,18 and they must also consider preferences of the child, if
those preferences are based upon sound reasoning.19  Trial courts
must weigh the health and behavior of the child,20 any credible evi-
dence of abuse inflicted upon family or household members,21 and any
“[c]redible evidence of child abuse or neglect or domestic intimate
partner abuse.”22  In addition to the factors listed in section 43-
2923(6), trial courts must also consider the entire scope of section 43-
2923, which further contemplates issues such as parental communica-
15. Ritter v. Ritter, 234 Neb. 203, 210, 450 N.W.2d 204, 210 (1990).
16. Id.; Gress, 271 Neb. at 126, 710 N.W.2d at 324.
17. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2923(6) (Reissue 2016).
18. Id. § 43-2923(6)(a).
19. Id. § 43-2923(6)(b); see Miles v. Miles, 231 Neb. 782, 785, 438 N.W.2d 139, 142
(1989) (“While the wishes of the child are not controlling in the determination of
custody, if a child is of sufficient age and has expressed an intelligent preference,
his preference is entitled to consideration.”).
20. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2923(6)(c).
21. Id. § 43-2923(6)(d).  This section neither states whether the abuse inquiry is rela-
tive to the parents in question, nor whether “family member” as defined by this
section is tethered to any specific party’s family member.  For example, if rele-
vant, probative evidence can be introduced that the uncle of a parent who
brought a custody action with respect to Child A inflicted abuse on his spouse
(the great aunt of Child A), then it is arguable that a court must consider such
evidence under this section.
22. Id. § 43-2923(6)(e).
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tion, agreements, and mediation plans; domestic violence, child devel-
opment, and school attendance.23
Beyond the enumerated list of best-interests considerations that
are statutorily mandated, the Supreme Court of Nebraska has added
the following common law considerations:
[C]ourts may consider factors such as general considerations of moral fitness
of the child’s parents, including the parents’ sexual conduct; respective envi-
ronments offered by each parent; the emotional relationship between child
and parents; the age, sex, and health of the child and parents; the effect on the
child as the result of continuing or disrupting an existing relationship; the
attitude and stability of each parent’s character; parental capacity to provide
physical care and satisfy educational needs of the child; the child’s preferen-
tial desire regarding custody if the child is of sufficient age of comprehension
regardless of chronological age, and when such child’s preference for custody
is based on sound reasons; and the general health, welfare, and social behav-
ior of the child.24
In light of these best-interest factors, the language of section 42-
364(2) limits judicial presumptions in custody actions,25 and also for-
bids trial courts from preferring the sex of one parent over the other
parent’s sex.26  In addition, the Nebraska Legislature has codified the
requirement of parenting plans in custody disputes in line with the
national trend.27  This requirement has influenced best-interests
analyses in Nebraska by enhancing judicial deference to agreeable
parents, who are often “in a better position than almost any third
party to know the family situation and the needs of the child . . . .”28
However, the Nebraska Legislature has yet to enact a presumption
into law that favors parental agreements,29 and although custody
agreements between parties are often persuasive in Nebraska courts,
23. See Kamal v. Imroz, 277 Neb. 116, 121, 759 N.W.2d 914, 917–18 (2009) (requiring
trial courts to consider the entirety of section 43-2923, specifically section 43-
2923(4), before establishing a parenting plan and thus awarding custody).
24. Davidson v. Davidson, 254 Neb. 357, 368, 576 N.W.2d 779, 785 (1998) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
25. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(2) (Reissue 2016).  The major exception to Nebraska’s
limitation on custody presumptions is found in section 43-2933, which presump-
tively bars custody awards to registered sex offenders or persons residing with
registered sex offenders unless a court determines that such a custodial arrange-
ment presents “no significant risk to the child.” Id. § 43-2933. See State ex rel.
Jakai C. v. Tiffany M., 292 Neb. 68, 871 N.W.2d 230 (2015) (finding no significant
risk of harm regarding a child living with her stepfather who registered as a sex
offender).
26. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(2).
27. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(1)(a).  For an overview of state requirements regarding
parenting plans, see Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Primary Caretaker Role of
Respective Parents as Factor in Awarding Custody of Child, 41 A.L.R.4th 1129,
1134–35 (1985).
28. LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4:7 (rev. ed. 2015).
29. Id. at 439 n.2.
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they are not determinative.30  Furthermore, the Parenting Act ex-
pressly grants Nebraska courts the power to nullify a custody ar-
rangement if such an arrangement is not in the best interests of the
child;31 and while Nebraska’s current statutory scheme permits joint
physical custody as a discretionary option for trial courts, it does not
require joint physical custody as a presumptive award.32
In 2007, the Nebraska Legislature’s Judiciary Committee held
hearings regarding a potential amendment to the Parenting Act that
sought to include a joint physical custody presumption.33  Such an
amendment was never passed, and currently Nebraska’s statutes do
not include a presumption in favor of joint physical custody.34  Yet,
the Nebraska Legislature has historically adopted special statutory
provisions to protect certain parental actions from best-interests scru-
tiny under section 43-2923(6)(a).35  For example, section 43-2929.01(3)
expressly forbade Nebraska courts from considering “military mem-
bership, mobilization, deployment, absence, relocation, or failure to
comply with custody, parenting time, visitation, or other access orders
because of military duty” from factoring into best-interests analyses.36
Through this interconnected web of statutory meanderings, refine-
ments, and common law doctrines, Nebraska courts must apply case-
specific facts and determine the best custodial arrangements for chil-
dren locked in difficult tug-of-wars between diverging families.  Such
a system has tempted some courts to search for analytical
“shortcut[s].”37
30. Zerr v. Zerr, 7 Neb. App. 885, 891, 586 N.W.2d 465, 470 (1998) (“Thus, while
agreements for child custody and support are not binding on the court, as are
those involving matters other than child custody and support, even the latter are
subject to independent court scrutiny and a finding of conscionability is a prereq-
uisite to their binding effect.”) (internal quotations omitted).
31. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(3).
32. See id.; Klimek v. Klimek, 18 Neb. App. 82, 87, 775 N.W.2d 444, 450 (2009).
33. See Hearing Before the Judiciary Comm. on LB 47, LB 76, LB 413, LB 535, LB
554, and LB 682, 100th Neb. Leg. 27–28 (2007) (statement of Amy S. Geren, and
statement of Sen. Steve Lathrop, Vice Chairperson, Neb. Leg. Judiciary Comm.)
(discussing the inherent problems of a legal presumption in favor of joint physical
custody).
34. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-2920–43-2943 (Reissue 2016); supra note 10.
35. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2923(6)(a).
36. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2929.01(3) (Cum. Supp. 2014 & Supp. 2015) (repealed
2016).  This statute has been repealed by the Nebraska Legislature and has since
been replaced with the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act,
which became operative January 1, 2016.  L.B. 219, 2015 Leg., 104th Sess. (Neb.
2015).
37. See JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 220 (2006) (dis-
cussing judicial use of the primary-caregiver preference as a means to resolve
vagueness issues inherent in best-interests analyses).
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B. The Primary-Caregiver Preference
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has expressly rejected a per se
rule that would award custody of minor children to their primary
caregiver.38  Nevertheless, the supreme court has interpreted the Ne-
braska Parenting Act to create a preference in favor of the child’s pri-
mary-caregiver, which weighs as a factor in best-interests analyses.39
The fundamental principal underlying the application of a best-inter-
ests analysis in child-custody cases is to reasonably infer what “past
conduct . . . may be expected in the future . . .” in order to determine
the best prospective situation for children involved in custody dis-
putes.40  This retrospective analysis allows trial courts to utilize tan-
gible facts in order to determine difficult custody awards.
As mentioned above, Nebraska courts are statutorily required to
analyze a multitude of past events and parental actions before deter-
mining prospective custody awards of minor children.41  From these
statutory commands, namely section 43-2923(6)(a), and from a histori-
cal framework of common law preferences,42 Nebraska courts have de-
veloped and utilized the primary-caregiver preference to differentiate
relative parity between parents seeking sole custody.43
The basic premise of the primary-caregiver preference is to grant
custody to the parent who has historically provided the most supervi-
sion and guidance to the minor child in question.44
[V]irtually all of the courts which have considered the [primary caregiver] is-
sue have taken the view, either expressly or by necessary implication, that in
determining which parent should be awarded custody of the parties’ child,
when other factors bearing on the parties’ ability to provide for the best inter-
38. Applegate v. Applegate, 236 Neb. 418, 418, 461 N.W.2d 419, 420 (1990) (“At the
outset we reject adoption of the primary caretaker rule as a per se rule.”).  To
distinguish between the primary-caregiver preference and the primary-caretaker
doctrine, it is important to note that the primary-caregiver preference is an evolu-
tion of the primary-caretaker doctrine, a custody presumption first recognized in
West Virginia that acts as an “almost absolute preference to award custody to the
primary caretaker parent of young children, regardless of the parent’s gender.”  2
Child Custody And Visitation: Law And Practice § 10.06[3][b] (Matthew Bender
2006).  Although remnants of the primary-caretaker presumption may be found
to varying degrees in other jurisdictions, a jurisdiction recognizing an absolute
adherence to the primary-caretaker presumption “no longer exists.”  59 AM. JUR.
2D Parent and Child § 30 (2012).
39. Applegate, 236 Neb. at 418, 461 N.W.2d at 420.
40. Nadel, supra note 27, at 1134.
41. See supra notes 10–31.
42. For a historical context of child custody awards and the evolution of custody pre-
sumptions, see J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of One to Shared Parenting:
Custody Presumptions in Law and Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213 (2014).
43. See, e.g., Pohlmann v. Pohlmann, 20 Neb. App. 290, 298, 824 N.W.2d 63, 70
(2012) (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2923(6)(a) to uphold the district court’s cus-
tody award, which it determined based on the primary-caregiver preference).
44. Nadel, supra note 27, at 1134–35.
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ests of the child are relatively equal, considerable weight should be given to
which parent was the primary caretaker of the child, especially where the
child was of tender years . . . .  In so holding, these courts have reasoned that
it would be in the best interests of the child to award his or her custody to the
parent on whom the child has depended for satisfying his or her basic physical
and psychological needs, regardless of the sex of the proposed
custodian . . . .45
In determining which party is the child’s primary caregiver, Ne-
braska courts decipher factual evidence that illuminates the respec-
tive parties’ past relationships with their child.46  Specifically,
Nebraska courts look to see which party’s responsibilities included
“feeding the [child], playing with the [child], getting the [child] ready
in the mornings, putting the [child] to bed at night, helping the [child]
with [his or her] homework, and making and keeping the [child’s] vari-
ous appointments.”47
The ALR notes that this preference, whether intentional or not,
typically favors mothers, even if they are employed.48  Some scholars
have argued that this preference, along with best-interests analyses in
general, has led to gender bias in the courts with respect to custody
awards.49  As of August of 2015, twenty-five of Nebraska’s thirty-three
appellate-reviewed custody awards decided in whole or in part by us-
ing the primary-caregiver preference have resulted in custody awards
45. Id.
46. See Staman v. Staman, 225 Neb. 864, 867, 408 N.W.2d 320, 322 (1987).
47. See Pohlmann, 20 Neb. App. at 295, 824 N.W.2d at 68.
48. Nadel, supra note 27, at 1135.
49. See 131 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Gender Bias as Factor in Child Custody
Cases §§ 2, 6 (2013); see also Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of
the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minne-
sota’s Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 427, 448–49 (1990) (summarizing critical arguments against the primary-
caregiver preference, which argue that the preference is biased toward mothers);
Douglas Dotterweich & Michael McKinney, National Attitudes Regarding Gender
Bias in Child Custody Cases, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 208, 220 (2000)
(finding more than 53% of judges in Texas, a primary-caregiver preference state,
believe that fathers rarely or never receive fair consideration when seeking sole
custody of their children, whereas 10% of Texas judges believe that fathers al-
ways receive fair consideration); Ronald K. Henry, ‘Primary Caretaker’: Is It A
Ruse?, FAM. ADVOC., Summer 1994, at 53, 53 (arguing that the primary-caregiver
preference is a “masquerade[ of] equality”).
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to mothers, while eight have resulted in custody awards to fathers.50
Rommers falls within the majority.51
C. The Facts of Rommers
In January 2013, Aaron Rommers, claiming his three-year mar-
riage with Elizabeth Rommers was at an end, filed a complaint for
dissolution of marriage in the District Court for Holt County, Ne-
braska.52  He asserted in his complaint that both he and Elizabeth
were fit and proper parents, and he accordingly sought joint physical
and joint legal custody over their infant child, Samantha.53
At trial, Aaron testified that Elizabeth left their marital residence
in Ewing, Nebraska with Samantha and moved to Arizona in Decem-
ber of 2012.54  He claimed the departure was sudden and that Eliza-
50. Cases finding for mothers include: Molczyk v. Molczyk, 285 Neb. 96, 110, 825
N.W.2d 435, 446 (2013); Kamal v. Imroz, 277 Neb. 116, 123, 759 N.W.2d 914, 919
(2009); Gress v. Gress, 271 Neb. 122, 126, 710 N.W.2d 318, 325 (2006); Marcovitz
v. Rogers, 267 Neb. 456, 466, 675 N.W.2d 132, 142 (2004); McLaughlin v. Mc-
Laughlin, 264 Neb. 232, 246, 647 N.W.2d 577, 590 (2002); Schaefer v. Schaefer,
263 Neb. 785, 789, 642 N.W.2d 792, 797 (2002); Smith-Helstrom v. Yonker, 249
Neb. 449, 461, 544 N.W.2d 93, 101 (1996); Leonard v. Leonard, No. A-13-942,
2014 WL 5439773, at *5 (Neb. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2014); Rommers v. Rommers, 22
Neb. App. 606, 617, 858 N.W.2d 607, 619 (2014); Crumbliss v. Crumbliss, No. A-
12-822, 2013 WL 5366333, at *5 (Neb. Ct. App. July 16, 2013); Pohlmann, 20
Neb. App. at 299, 824 N.W.2d at 71 (2012); Stark v. Weatherholt, No. A-11-446,
2012 WL 661353, at *6 (Neb. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2012); Klimek v. Klimek, 18 Neb.
App. 82, 88, 775 N.W.2d 444, 451 (2009); Edwards v. Edwards, 16 Neb. App. 297,
323, 744 N.W.2d 243, 262 (2008); Meister v. Meister, No. A-03-1157, 2005 WL
625888, at *6 (Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2005); Kay v. Ludwig, 12 Neb. App. 868, 884,
686 N.W.2d 619, 631 (2004); Bartels v. Bartels, No. A-03-559, 2004 WL 1380175,
at *4 (Neb. Ct. App. June 22, 2004); Bierbower v. Bierbower, No. A-00-1099, 2001
WL 1091133, at *6 (Neb. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2001); Smith v. Smith, 9 Neb. App. 975,
981, 623 N.W.2d 705, 712 (2001); Gochenouer v. Gochenouer, No. A-99-516, 2000
WL 351100, at *6 (Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2000); Dunn v. Dunn, No. A-95-491,
1996 WL 70972, at *7 (Neb. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 1996); Drevo v. Drevo, No. A-95-
193, 1996 WL 5863, at *4 (Neb. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1996); Adams v. Adams, No. A-
91-437, 1993 WL 120294, at *7 (Neb. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1993); Taylor v. Taylor,
No. A-92-130, 1993 WL 80591, at *4 (Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1993); Phillips v.
Phillips, No. A-91-895, 1992 WL 132307, at *2 (Neb. Ct. App. May 26, 1992).
Cases finding for fathers include: Maska v. Maska, 274 Neb. 629, 635, 742
N.W.2d 492, 497 (2007); Ziebarth v. Ziebarth, 238 Neb. 545, 557, 471 N.W.2d 450,
458 (1991); Applegate v. Applegate, 236 Neb. 418, 419, 461 N.W.2d 419, 420
(1990); State ex rel. Jade K. v. Luke K., No. A-12-1144, 2013 WL 5911205, at *5
(Neb. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2013); Schnell v. Schnell, 12 Neb. App. 321, 326, 673
N.W.2d 578, 584 (2003); Tremain v. Tremain, No. A-00-067, 2000 WL 1673320, at
*5 (Neb. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2000); Judge v. Judge, No. A-96-064, 1996 WL 737585,
at *4 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1996); Wiese v. Wiese, No. A-92-312, 1993 WL
35711, at *5 (Neb. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1993).
51. Rommers, 22 Neb. App. at 619, 858 N.W.2d at 617.
52. Id. at 608, 858 N.W.2d at 611.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 609, 858 N.W.2d at 611.
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beth left without providing him notification of the move.55  In June,
Elizabeth gave Aaron permission to come to Arizona to see
Samantha.56  Aaron made the 1,400 mile, twenty-four-hour car trip
and spent four nights in Arizona.57  On the first night, Elizabeth re-
fused Aaron permission to see Samantha.58  By the second day of
Aaron’s trip, Elizabeth had rescinded her visitation refusal, permit-
ting Aaron to see Samantha for an average of three hours per day,
split between two daily visits.59  Before the divorce proceedings,
Aaron’s only other communication with Samantha was limited to
video calls over the Internet.60
Aaron testified that he was unable to financially support Elizabeth
and Samantha’s new living expenses in Arizona.61  Aaron also testi-
fied that he believed Elizabeth’s motive for moving to Arizona
stemmed from her observation of emails that Aaron had received from
another woman.62  He denied these communications, and he also de-
nied Elizabeth’s assertions that Aaron had “lashed out against prop-
erty in moments of frustration.”63  Aaron’s aunt testified that Aaron
was a proud and fit father and that she had last observed Aaron with
Samantha three months before Elizabeth’s departure.64  Aaron’s
mother, Laura Rommers, testified that Aaron had regularly per-
formed caregiving tasks for Samantha before Elizabeth’s departure,
such as changing Samantha’s diapers and bathing her.65  Laura con-
ceded that Aaron did not have many opportunities to feed Samantha
because Elizabeth breast fed Samantha.66  Laura also testified that
Aaron was the financial provider for the family and that Elizabeth
became a stay-at-home mother after Samantha was born.67
Elizabeth counterclaimed for sole custody over Samantha and re-
quested that Aaron’s future visitations be supervised.68  Elizabeth tes-
tified that she was Samantha’s primary caregiver and that Aaron had
not assisted Elizabeth in rearing Samantha.69  Elizabeth claimed that
Aaron would yell “shut up” at Samantha when she cried and that he
would destroy property in frustration when Samantha displayed col-
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 610, 858 N.W.2d at 612.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 612, 858 N.W.2d at 613.
69. Id. at 611, 858 N.W.2d at 612.
2017] PRIMARY-CAREGIVER PREFERENCE 841
icky symptoms.70  Elizabeth also claimed that Aaron had inappropri-
ate communications with minor girls, and she presented evidence to
the district court of a sexually explicit picture that Aaron had received
from a girl who was between the ages of twelve and thirteen.71  She
had reported this incident to police.72
Elizabeth disputed Aaron’s contention that she had left for Arizona
in December 2012 without providing notice.73  She testified that she
had left Aaron her wedding ring and a note.74  Upon arriving in Ari-
zona, Elizabeth stayed with her brother, his wife, and their six chil-
dren in a four-bedroom home.75  She testified that she and Samantha
shared a room and that she planned for her stay with her brother to be
temporary.76  Elizabeth began working thirty hours per week as a
truck-stop cashier, earning $8.50 per hour,77 and during her employ-
ment hours, Elizabeth’s sister-in-law was responsible for providing
care for Samantha.78  Elizabeth also testified that she had never re-
fused Aaron’s visitation requests with Samantha so long as he was
willing to travel to Arizona.79
D. District and Appellate Court Holdings in Rommers
The district court awarded sole physical and legal custody of
Samantha to Elizabeth, finding that such an award was in
Samantha’s best interests.80  The court held Aaron responsible for
$424 of child support per month after deducting $75 per month to ac-
count for travel expenses to and from Arizona.81  Aaron was awarded
one continuous week of parenting time each year until Samantha’s
fifth birthday, upon which his parenting time would be increased to
six continuous weeks per year.82  He was also awarded various holi-
days for parenting time and a guaranteed video call to last no less
than fifteen minutes per day for three days per week.83
In reaching its decisions, the district court analyzed the best inter-
ests of Samantha, to which it applied various factual findings.84  After
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 613, 858 N.W.2d at 613.
73. Id. at 611, 858 N.W.2d at 613.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 612, 858 N.W.2d at 613.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 614, 858 N.W.2d at 614.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 614–15, 858 N.W.2d at 614.
84. Id. at 613, 858 N.W.2d at 613.
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weighing relevant testimony, the court found Elizabeth to be
Samantha’s primary caregiver; however, the court found that Aaron
also helped in caregiving.85  The district court found that “there was
no credible evidence of child abuse, neglect, or domestic intimate part-
ner abuse, but that Aaron had a temper and had acted out in a physi-
cal and aggressive manner which justified Elizabeth’s concerns about
leaving Aaron alone with Samantha.”86  The court found enough evi-
dence to call into question Aaron’s moral fitness,87 and the only evi-
dence the court weighed against Elizabeth was her removal of
Samantha to Arizona, because it provided no better employment op-
portunities for her and deprived Samantha of contact from Aaron’s
family.88  Aaron timely appealed to the Court of Appeals of
Nebraska.89
Upon review, the court of appeals scrutinized the district court’s
best-interests analysis.90  In doing so, the court interpreted the Ne-
braska Parenting Act, Gress, and various moral factors proscribed by
the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Robb.91  The court of appeals gave
weight to the district court’s observation of witnesses and likewise de-
termined Elizabeth to be Samantha’s primary caregiver.92  The court
of appeals echoed the district-court finding that “Elizabeth was con-
cerned with Aaron’s moral fitness after finding a picture of a naked
woman on his cell phone and social media Web site conversations with
other women on his computer.”93  In affirming the district court, the
court of appeals concluded that “[b]oth parents [were] fit to parent
Samantha, but because Elizabeth [was] the primary caregiver of
Samantha, custody with Elizabeth [was] not an abuse of discretion.”94
III. ROMMERS ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals of Nebraska committed two reversible errors
in reaching its decision to uphold the district court’s sole-custody
award to Elizabeth Rommers.  First, the court of appeals erroneously
85. Id. at 613, 858 N.W.2d at 614.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 613, 858 N.W.2d at 613.
89. Id. at 615, 858 N.W.2d at 614.
90. Id. at 617, 858 N.W.2d at 616.
91. Id. at 618, 858 N.W.2d at 616 (“Other pertinent factors include the moral fitness
of the child’s parents, including sexual conduct; respective environments offered
by each parent; the age, sex, and health of the child and parents; the effect on the
child as a result of continuing or disrupting an existing relationship; the attitude
and stability of each parent’s character; and the parental capacity to provide
physical care and satisfy educational needs of the child.”).
92. Id. at 618–19, 858 N.W.2d at 617.
93. Id. at 619, 858 N.W.2d at 617.
94. Id.
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applied Nebraska statutory and common law governing best-interests
analyses.  By giving more weight to the primary-caregiver preference
than other more compelling factors such as moral fitness, the court of
appeals incorrectly promoted the primary-caregiver preference to the
status of a first-class factor among equal peers.95  Second, the court of
appeals procedurally misapplied the primary-caregiver preference by
implementing the preference before properly realizing a best-interests
stalemate between parties.  In committing these two errors, as dis-
cussed below, the court of appeals broadened the use of the primary-
caregiver preference beyond precedential limits, clouding prospective
application of the primary-caregiver preference in Nebraska child cus-
tody cases.
A. Disproportionate Best-Interests Factors
While performing its best-interests analysis, the Rommers court
erroneously prioritized the primary-caregiver preference over
equivalent factors.  As previously mentioned, Nebraska law requires a
best-interests analysis pursuant to statutory mandates in the Ne-
braska Parenting Act and common law factors incorporated by the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska.96  The supreme court has defined best-
interests analysis under section 43-2923 of the Nebraska Parenting
Act to include the primary-caregiver preference as one of many fac-
tors.97  The court has refused to interpret section 43-2923(6)(a) to es-
tablish the primary-caregiver preference as the sole, determinative
factor in child custody awards,98 and instead has applied the prefer-
ence for its utility in determining “[t]he relationship of the minor child
to each parent prior to the commencement of the action or any subse-
quent hearing.”99  While it is not uncommon for Nebraska courts to
rely on the primary-caregiver preference as a deciding factor in cus-
tody awards,100 section 43-2923 forbids Nebraska courts from disre-
95. See infra section III.A.
96. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-2920–43-2943 (Reissue 2016); supra note 10; Robb v.
Robb, 268 Neb. 694, 701–02, 687 N.W.2d 195, 202 (2004).
97. See Molczyk v. Molczyk, 285 Neb. 96, 109, 825 N.W.2d 435, 446 (2013); Kamal v.
Imroz, 277 Neb. 116, 121–22, 759 N.W.2d 914, 918 (2009); Maska v. Maska, 274
Neb. 629, 635, 742 N.W.2d 492, 497 (2007); Gress v. Gress, 271 Neb. 122, 126, 710
N.W.2d 318, 324–25 (2006); Applegate v. Applegate, 236 Neb. 418, 418, 461
N.W.2d 419, 420 (1990).
98. Applegate, 236 Neb. at 418, 461 N.W.2d at 420.
99. Id. (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (Reissue 1988), which has since been codi-
fied in the Nebraska Parenting Act as NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2923(6)(a) (Reissue
2016)).
100. See, e.g., Molczyk, 285 Neb. at 109–10, 825 N.W.2d at 446 (“It is sufficient to say
the evidence showed that [the defendant] had been the children’s primary care-
taker and that [the plaintiff’s] temporary custody of them had not been in their
best interests.  The court did not abuse its discretion in awarding [the defendant]
sole custody.”) (emphasis added).
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garding other statutorily compelled factors to exclusively apply the
primary-caregiver preference.101  Accordingly, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska has carefully distinguished this distinction in its line of pri-
mary-caregiver decisions.102
First, it is important to note that the failure of a court to explicitly
state the factors upon which it has conducted its best-interests analy-
sis comprises a different situation from that of a court which has im-
properly weighed relevant factors under its best-interests analysis.
For example, the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Molczyk found no
abuse of discretion when a lower court failed to expressly state its use
of the best-interests factors used to determine a custody award.103  Al-
though the lower court in Molczyk did not provide an express account-
ing of its best-interests factors, the district court’s record provided
ample evidence to support its award.104  The record established that
the appellee was the child’s primary caregiver; the record also dis-
played sufficient alternative evidence against finding custody for the
appellant.105  Although the district court did not expressly state these
findings in its holding, the supreme court found no abuse of discretion
from such an exclusion because the law presumes “in a bench trial
that the judge was familiar with and applied the proper rules of law
unless it clearly appears otherwise.”106
This distinction is vital in recognizing the flaw in Rommers, be-
cause although the district court and the court of appeals in Rommers
clearly identified the appropriate factors to weigh in issuing and up-
holding a custody award, the court of appeals in Rommers improperly
upheld the district court’s decision by using the primary-caregiver
preference alone, therein distinguishing its holding from Molcyzk.
In line with Molcyzk, the Supreme Court of Nebraska has consist-
ently treated the primary-caregiver preference as incapable of suffic-
ing as the sole factor for determining custody under the best-interests
analysis.107  For example, the Maska court examined a district court
ruling that failed to specify which best-interests factors it had used in
101. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2923(6)(e) (“In determining custody and parenting arrange-
ments, the court shall consider the best interests of the minor child, which shall
include, but not be limited to, consideration of the foregoing factors and . . . (e)
[c]redible evidence of child abuse or neglect or domestic intimate partner abuse.
For purposes of this subdivision, the definitions in section 43-2922 shall be
used.”) (emphasis added).
102. See Molczyk, 285 Neb. at 109, 825 N.W.2d at 446; Kamal, 277 Neb. at 121–22, 759
N.W.2d at 918; Maska, 274 Neb. at 635, 742 N.W.2d at 497; Gress, 271 Neb. at
126, 710 N.W.2d at 324–25; Applegate, 236 Neb. at 418, 461 N.W.2d at 420.
103. Molczyk, 285 Neb. at 109, 825 N.W.2d at 446.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. See Maska, 274 Neb. at 635, 742 N.W.2d at 497.
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determining its custody award.108  Like the Molcyzk court, the Maska
court had determined that the failure of a district court to expressly
state the factors it used to determine the best interests of a child had
no appealable merit.109  However, the Maska court continued to ex-
amine the record of the district court to ensure that proper best-inter-
ests factors, although not expressly stated, were indeed in the
record.110  The court noted that “[t]he record does not establish that
either parent was unfit, although it was clear that the parties had had
a ‘violent and abusive relationship towards each other . . . .’ ”111  After
checking the record for parental fitness, the court weighed the follow-
ing considerations:
[G]eneral considerations of moral fitness of the child’s parents, including the
parents’ sexual conduct; respective environments offered by each parent; the
emotional relationship between child and parents; the age, sex, and health of
the child and the parents; the effect on the child as the result of continuing or
disrupting an existing relationship; the attitude and stability of each parent’s
character, parental capacity to provide physical care and satisfy educational
needs of the child; and many other factors relevant to the general health, wel-
fare, and well-being of the child.112
The court found that the appellee was the child’s primary caregiver,
but the court weighed this factor in addition to noting that the appel-
lee was a more supportive parent who would provide a better environ-
ment for the child during the school year.113  The fact that the
appellee was the child’s primary caregiver was a factor considered by
the court, but such a factor was insufficient by itself to determine
custody.114
Although the Rommers court correctly noted that binding prece-
dent and Nebraska statutes govern best-interests analyses, the Rom-
mers court failed to correctly apply them.115  For instance, the court of
appeals identified the condemning evidence of Aaron’s moral fitness
with regard to nude pictures of minor girls that the district court
noted in its record,116  and it acknowledged the documented episodes
of Aaron’s anger and frustration manifested in response to
Samantha’s colicky conditions.117  Yet, despite these observations, the
Rommers court upheld the lower court’s custody award entirely upon
the primary-caregiver preference.
108. Id. at 633, 742 N.W.2d at 496.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 634, 742 N.W.2d at 496.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 633–34, 742 N.W.2d at 496.
113. Id. at 635, 742 N.W.2d at 497.
114. See id.
115. See Rommers v. Rommers, 22 Neb. App. 606, 619, 858 N.W.2d 607, 617 (2014)
(reciting the law on best-interests analysis).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 618–19, 858 N.W.2d at 617.
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Such a ruling diverges from Molczyk and Maska, and entirely ig-
nores section 43-2923’s “shall consider” language, which requires Ne-
braska courts to weigh multiple factors.  Accordingly, it is vital to
recognize that the Nebraska Legislature’s use of the words “shall con-
sider” connotes more than the mere recognition of facts.  Instead, the
Nebraska Legislature’s choice of words requires courts to both recog-
nize and evaluate the factors enumerated in section 43-2923.  While
there is no doubt that the Rommers court recognized the moral-fitness
concerns raised by the district court,118 the court failed to evaluate
these concerns when it based its holding entirely upon the primary-
caregiver preference.
To illustrate this point, consider two plausible lines of reasoning
that the Rommers court utilized in crafting its holding.  Either (1) the
court of appeals recognized and evaluated the evidence of Aaron’s
moral-fitness shortcomings and determined that such evidence was
outweighed by the fact that Elizabeth was Samantha’s primary
caregiver, or (2) the court of appeals failed to evaluate statutorily re-
quired factors and errantly based its holding upon the primary-
caregiver preference alone.  If the court employed the latter line of
reasoning, the decision clearly runs afoul of the “shall consider” lan-
guage of section 43-2923.
Yet, the former line of reasoning is also erroneous because it would
create a new precedent that favors the primary-caregiver preference
over evidence of moral-fitness concerns under Nebraska common law
and child-welfare factors under section 43-2923(6)(c), thus subverting
the statutorily compelled best-interests factors of section 43-2923 in
favor of the primary-caregiver preference.  It is incredible to imagine a
Nebraska appellate court disregarding credible evidence of child por-
nography and intimate partner abuse by casually upholding the pri-
mary-caregiver preference.  Moreover, such reasoning ultimately
subverts the purpose of best-interests analyses—to protect chil-
dren.119  However, if this is the line of reasoning adopted by the Rom-
mers court, then Rommers stands to erode the protective aspects of
best-interests analyses by disregarding evidence of harm in favor of
the primary-caregiver preference.
Moreover, because the Rommers court acknowledged that the dis-
trict court had based its custody award on the fact that Elizabeth was
the primary caregiver and that evidentiary findings sufficiently
showed that Aaron had directed physical outbursts toward his child,
118. See id. at 619, 858 N.W.2d at 617.
119. See, e.g., Petersen v. Petersen, 190 Neb. 805, 807, 212 N.W.2d 580, 581 (1973)
(“[The purpose of the best-interests analysis] is preventive as well as remedial;
and when . . . the trial court determines a child could suffer harm by remaining in
his present home then it would be incumbent upon that court to order a change
[of custody].”).
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had possessed child pornography, and had committed sexual impro-
prieties against his wife,120 it seems unlikely that the court of appeals
intended for its holding to completely disregard this evidence in favor
of the sole finding that Elizabeth was Samantha’s primary caregiver.
If such a holding is to be believed, then credible evidence of the com-
mon law factors expressed in Maska and Davidson would become ir-
relevant when juxtaposed with the primary-caregiver preference.
Conversely, if Aaron had presented credible evidence showing that
Elizabeth had possessed child pornography, had displayed physical
frustration toward Samantha’s colicky conditions, and had committed
sexual improprieties against Aaron, then such evidence would be irrel-
evant to a showing that Elizabeth was Samantha’s primary caregiver.
Instead, it seems more probable that the court of appeals meant to
hold that “because Elizabeth [was] the primary caregiver of
Samantha,”121 and because the record showed that there was credible
evidence to call into question Aaron’s moral fitness, “custody with Eliz-
abeth [was] not an abuse of discretion.”122  A ruling based entirely
upon the primary-caregiver preference either negates the Nebraska
Legislature’s “shall consider” mandate, or it relegates the statutory
factors of the Nebraska Parenting Act and various other common law
best-interests factors moot when juxtaposed to the primary-caregiver
preference.
B. The Proper Timing of Primary-Caregiver Preference
Analysis
Second, the Rommers court displaced the proper timing for the ap-
plication of the primary-caregiver preference by analyzing the prefer-
ence before it was relevant.  As mentioned above, a majority of
jurisdictions apply the primary-caregiver preference only “when other
factors bearing on the parties’ ability to provide for the best interests
of the child are relatively equal.”123  In essence, the primary-caregiver
preference functions as a tie-breaker for courts that must, for various
reasons, award primary or sole custody to one parent.124  Courts have
generally applied the primary-caregiver preference in this capacity be-
cause, without more substantive, determinative factors present,
courts feel comfortable awarding custody to the parent “on whom the
child has depended for satisfying his or her basic physical and psycho-
logical needs.”125  The Supreme Court of Nebraska has yet to decide
when the application of the primary-caregiver preference is appropri-
120. Rommers, 22 Neb. App. at 613–14, 858 N.W.2d at 613–14.
121. Id. at 619, 858 N.W.2d at 617.
122. Id.
123. See Nadel, supra note 27, at 1134.
124. See id. at 1134–35.
125. See id.
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ate in a best-interests analysis,126 but Nebraska courts have been
generally consistent in their application of the primary-caregiver
preference.127
For example, the Court of Appeals of Nebraska in Pohlmann up-
held a district court custody award between two parents whom the
district court had determined to be relatively equal under its best-in-
terests analysis.128  On appeal, the Pohlmann court was forced to dis-
tinguish between these parents, both of whom presented questionable
character flaws.  The first parent had admitted to inappropriate sex-
ual behavior during her marriage, which had brought “public animos-
ity towards her . . . [and] adversely affected [her] minor children.”129
The second parent had spent most of his time away from the children
while working on his farm, and the evidence showed that the children
were more likely to succeed in a new environment away from the one
in which he (the second parent) lived.130  To emphasize its struggle to
find one parent more suitable for the children under its best-interests
analysis, the district court stated that “[t]his is truly unfortunate, for
this looked to be a case where the parties, if left alone, could have
worked out a joint custody relationship.”131  Forced to break the tie,
the district court determined that the first parent was the children’s
primary caregiver and accordingly awarded her primary custody.132
The court of appeals affirmed this decision, finding no abuse of
discretion.133
In a similar fashion, the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Gress re-
lied on the primary-caregiver preference to uphold a district court’s
custody award against the appellant whom the district court had de-
termined to be relatively equal to the appellee under its best-interests
analysis.134  The supreme court agreed with the lower court’s find-
ings, stating that “[b]oth parents had loving, caring relationships with
126. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Applegate refused to
adopt the primary-caregiver preference as a per se rule for awarding custody and
instead stated that the primary-caregiver preference “is simply one of several
considerations.”  Applegate v. Applegate, 236 Neb. 418, 418, 461 N.W.2d 419, 420
(1990).  It is important to note that the Applegate court never determined the
proper timing for applying the primary-caregiver preference.
127. See, e.g., Pohlmann v. Pohlmann, 20 Neb. App. 290, 299, 824 N.W.2d 63, 71
(2012) (holding that even though both parties were shown to be fit and loving
parents, the award of custody to the primary caregiver was not an abuse of
discretion).
128. Id. at 295–97, 824 N.W.2d at 68–69.
129. Id. at 297, 824 N.W.2d at 69.
130. Id. at 299, 824 N.W.2d at 71.
131. Id. at 297, 824 N.W.2d at 70.
132. Id. at 297, 824 N.W.2d at 69.
133. Id. at 299, 824 N.W.2d at 71.
134. Gress v. Gress, 271 Neb. 122, 125–26, 710 N.W.2d 318, 324 (2006).
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the children prior to the dissolution action . . . .”135  The Gress court
partially based its decision to uphold the lower court’s custody award
on the fact that the children had stated a preference for custody with
the appellee; nevertheless, the supreme court applied the primary-
caregiver preference in favor of the appellee, but only after the court
had found on review that both parents were “fit . . . [and] loving.”136
The flaw in Rommers’ implementation of the primary-caregiver
preference stems from the timing of the court’s application.  The court
of appeals applied the primary-caregiver preference in its analysis af-
ter it upheld the district court’s finding that both parents were fit, but
such application was unnecessary because the parties in question
lacked parental parity under the district court’s best-interests
analysis.137
For example, the Pohlmann and Gress courts struggled to differen-
tiate between two otherwise similarly situated parents under their
best-interests analyses.138  Faced with situations that required an
award of primary custody, these courts searched for a tie-breaking fac-
tor permissible under section 43-2923 and settled on the primary-
caregiver preference.139  Yet, the relative best-interests equality found
in both Pohlmann and Gress is not found in Rommers.140  Although
135. Id. at 125, 710 N.W.2d at 324. The Supreme Court of Nebraska refused to review
evidence presented to the district court by the appellant that attempted to show
the appellee’s personality was subject to question under the district court’s best-
interests analysis.  The court found such evidence irrelevant because “there [was]
no indication that the [district] court gave any particular weight to the testimony
of either expert.” Id.
136. Id. at 125–26, 710 N.W.2d at 324.  In applying the primary-caregiver preference,
the supreme court noted that the appellee “was responsible for the children’s care
from the time they were infants, including bathing the children, purchasing their
clothes, doing laundry, cooking the family meals, and taking the children to and
from school, activities, and doctor’s appointments.  Further, the youngest son
ha[d] Down syndrome and require[d] special care.  Although [the appellant] [was]
able and willing to care for him, [the appellee] work[ed] only part time outside the
home and consider[ed] her ‘vocation in life’ to be caring for her children.” Id. at
126, 710 N.W.2d at 324.
137. See Rommers v. Rommers, 22 Neb. App. 606, 619, 858 N.W.2d 607, 617 (2014);
Rommers v. Rommers, No. CI 13-1, slip op. at 8 (Neb. Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 2013)
(“[Aaron’s] explanation of the anonymous sender of the picture showing the na-
ked younger sister of a past girlfriend is not accepted by the court.  His penchant
for carrying on communications having sexual innuendo with much younger girls
does not reflect favorably on his moral fitness.  Elizabeth’s concerns about
Aaron’s behavior have merit.”).
138. See Pohlmann v. Pohlmann, 20 Neb. App. 290, 297, 824 N.W.2d 63, 69–70 (2012);
Gress, 271 Neb. at 125–26, 710 N.W.2d at 324.
139. See Pohlmann, 20 Neb. App. at 297, 824 N.W.2d at 69; Gress, 271 Neb. at 125–26,
710 N.W.2d at 324.
140. As mentioned above, the district court had found that Aaron had directed physi-
cal tantrums at Samantha, had possessed child pornography, and had committed
sexual improprieties against his wife. Rommers, 22 Neb. App. at 613–14, 858
N.W.2d at 613–14.
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the district court determined Aaron to be fit, Aaron’s lack of parenting
skills (culminating in his inability to properly cope with an ill child),
combined with his moral-fitness shortcomings, far outweighed any ev-
idence presented against Elizabeth.141  In fact, the only evidence that
the district court weighed against Elizabeth was its determination
that Elizabeth’s move to Arizona was not better for her employment
prospects and that Samantha’s new home in Arizona would make visi-
tation with Aaron’s family more difficult.142  The district court’s hold-
ing properly weighed caregiving evidence under section 43-2923(a) but
stopped short of using this evidence to satisfy an unnecessary pre-
sumption.  Its ultimate custody ruling was founded on the entirety of
evidence weighed against Aaron.143
However, the court of appeals, on review, interpreted the district
court’s evidentiary findings as sufficient to establish the requisite par-
ity needed to implement the primary-caregiver preference.  Yet, if
such evidence is sufficient to form the requisite best-interests parity
required to implement the primary-caregiver preference, then it is dif-
ficult to imagine a situation that would not permit Nebraska courts to
use the primary-caregiver preference as the ultimate determining fac-
tor in awarding custody.  A search for two parties further apart than
Elizabeth and Aaron Rommers in best-interests parity would almost
certainly yield one party who is unfit for custody, and therefore negate
the need for best-interests analyses in the first place.  Thus, if Rom-
mers is the extent to which a court can perceive the necessary parity
between two parties, then no best-interests analyses would be exempt
from the primary-caregiver preference.  Such a system runs counter to
the national application of the primary-caregiver preference144 and
against Nebraska’s own implementation.145
Furthermore, adherence to the best-interests analysis purported
by Rommers would likely serve to undermine the underlying purpose
of the primary-caregiver preference.  As mentioned above, the pri-
mary-caregiver preference is utilized as a tie-breaking procedure by
the courts to distinguish similarly situated parties in custody dis-
putes.146  To elevate the primary-caregiver preference to the position
of a custody presumption under Nebraska’s best-interests analyses,
141. On this point, it is important to note that the district court did not fault Elizabeth
for departing with Samantha for Arizona after finding child pornography on
Aaron’s phone. See id. at 613, 858 N.W.2d at 613.
142. Id.
143. Rommers v. Rommers, No. CI 13-1, slip op. at 10 (Neb. Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 2013)
(emphasis added) (“Based upon the whole of the evidence the court concludes that
it would be in Samantha’s best interests that her custody be awarded to
Elizabeth . . . .”).
144. See Nadel, supra note 27, at 1134–35.
145. See supra notes 43–51.
146. See Nadel, supra note 27, at 1134–35.
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such as the Rommers holding purports, is expressly forbidden by the
Nebraska Legislature via section 42-364(2).
Moreover, use of the primary-caregiver preference as the ultimate
deciding factor in a best-interests analysis creates inherent flaws ab-
sent from nearly all other substantive factors considered by Nebraska
courts.  First, courts have generally applied the primary-caregiver
preference for its value of stability to the child, i.e., placing the child
with “the parent on whom the child has depended.”147  Yet, Nebraska
courts are well aware of the volatile nature of child custody proceed-
ings, which is why the courts have stated that their focus in best-in-
terests analyses is directed toward the “immediate future” after a
custody award.148  While the other best-interests factors expressed in
section 43-2923 and by the Supreme Court of Nebraska are unlikely to
change immediately after the conclusion of custody proceedings,149 it
is inherently foreseeable that the previous role of a parent as a pri-
mary caregiver will change or significantly reshape itself after divorce
proceedings.  One need not look any further than Rommers for
proof.150
Second, and perhaps most importantly, by prioritizing the substan-
tive weight afforded to the primary-caregiver preference, Nebraska
courts will inevitably perpetuate gender bias in custody awards.151
With the exception of abuse,152 no other best-interests factor ex-
pressed in section 43-2923 or by the Supreme Court of Nebraska pro-
vides such an outcome determinative result based upon gender.153
147. See id.
148. See State ex rel. Dawn M. v. Jerrod M., 22 Neb. App. 835, 841, 861 N.W.2d 755,
761 (2015) (“The focus is on the best interests of the child now and in the immedi-
ate future, and how the custodial parent is behaving at the time of the modifica-
tion hearing and shortly prior to the hearing is therefore of greater significance
than past behavior when attempting to determine the best interests of the
child.”).
149. For example, it is difficult to foresee abusive tendencies or moral-fitness trepida-
tions of a parent immediately altering after a child custody award.
150. Immediately after separating from Aaron, Elizabeth began working thirty hours
per week, during which time the caregiving duties for Samantha fell to Eliza-
beth’s sister-in-law.  Rommers v. Rommers, 22 Neb. App. 606, 612, 858 N.W.2d
607, 613 (2014).
151. See 131 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, supra note 49, §§ 2, 6; supra note 50.
152. MICHELE C. BLACK, ET AL., THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIO-
LENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 44–45 (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/vi-
olenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/UT9T-AGX6]
(finding women nearly twice as likely as men to suffer from severe physical vio-
lence as a product of intimate partner abuse).
153. See 131 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, supra note 49, §§ 2, 6; supra note 50; see
also Crippen, supra note 49, at 448–49 (summarizing critical arguments against
the primary-caregiver preference, which argue that the preference is biased to-
ward mothers); Dotterweich & McKinney, supra note 49, at 220 (finding more
than 53% of judges in Texas, a primary-caregiver preference state, believe that
fathers rarely or never receive fair consideration when seeking sole custody of
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Rommers court erred in its application of the primary-
caregiver preference to uphold the District Court for Holt County’s
custody award, which granted Elizabeth Rommers sole custody of her
daughter, Samantha Rommers.  As discussed above, this decision
commits two legal mistakes and posits a plethora of unintended reper-
cussions.  First, the Court of Appeals of Nebraska errantly utilized the
primary-caregiver preference as the sole factor for upholding the dis-
trict court’s custody award.  In doing so, the court of appeals subverted
the Nebraska Legislature’s express commands in the Nebraska
Parenting Act and the Supreme Court of Nebraska’s common law con-
siderations for custody awards.154
Second, the court of appeals applied the primary-caregiver prefer-
ence at an improper time.155  By applying the primary-caregiver pref-
erence before a best-interests analysis tie-breaking procedure was
necessary, the court of appeals misapplied the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska’s implied, appropriate usage of the primary-caregiver prefer-
ence.  In doing so, the court of appeals prioritized the primary-
caregiver preference above other best-interests factors enumerated by
the Nebraska Parenting Act and the Supreme Court of Nebraska, ex-
panding the primary-caregiver preference beyond its tie-breaking
function and elevating it to the status of a superior substantive factor
under best-interests analyses.
Left unchanged, Rommers stands for the proposition that when a
court is faced with a parent in a custody dispute who possessed child
pornography, initiated frustrated displays of violence toward his in-
fant, and committed numerous sexual misconducts toward his wife,
the only important factor relevant in the court’s custody analysis is the
primary-caregiver preference.  Not only does such a holding promul-
gate gender bias and further frustrate an already arbitrary and com-
plicated system of determining child custody in Nebraska courts, it
also looms as erroneous precedent capable of perpetuating unintended
consequences upon Nebraska families and children.  Just as the mis-
interpretation of Official Baseball Rule 7.01 has steadily swallowed
the correct rule of America’s pastime, Rommers threatens to swallow
the purpose of the primary-caregiver preference—to break a tie.
their children, whereas 10% of Texas judges believe that fathers always receive
fair consideration); Henry, supra note 49, at 53 (arguing that the primary-
caregiver preference is a “masquerade[ of] equality”).
154. See supra section III.A.
155. See supra section III.B.
